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FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF AN ALL VOLUNTEER ARMED 
FORCE IN TURKEY 
ABSTRACT 
The military foundation of Turkish Republic has been forces raised by 
conscription based on citizens’ obligation to serve. This has, for the most part, worked 
very well both for the Turkish Armed Forces and for the Turkish people. However, 
conditions for Turkey have changed with a post-cold war national security environment, 
continuing economic growth, and increasing need for high-tech weapon systems. 
Accordingly, this project report provides a Draft versus All Volunteer Forces (AVF) 
analysis for the Turkish Armed Forces, by evaluating the feasibility and the desirability 
of an AVF for the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Drawing upon the information about the economy and national security 
environment and its relation, we have compared the conscripted forces in place in Turkey 
with all volunteer forces (as found, for example, in the United States). This project 
contributes to policy discussions by specifying the 21st century manpower needs of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. It also assesses methods of acquiring those manpower resources –
comparing the draft vs. AVF models in terms of economic and national security criteria. 
Hopefully, it will be useful in assisting implementation of the AVF concept in Turkish 
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Conscription is a general term for involuntary labor demanded by some 
established authority, but it is most often used in the specific sense of government 
policies that generally require male citizens to serve in the armed forces. Conscription is 
known by various names, for example, the most recent conscription program in the 
United States was known colloquially as “the draft”. Many nations do not maintain 
conscripted forces, instead, they rely on a volunteer, professional military. However, 
many of these countries still reserve the possibility of conscription for wartime and 
supply crises. 
Conscription has also sometimes been used as a general term for non-military 
involuntary labor demanded by some established authority, for example, some translators 
of Old Testament commentaries use the term to describe the levies of labor used to build 
the Temple of Solomon. In Japan during World War II, Japanese women and children 
were conscripted to work in factories. 
On the other hand, All Volunteer Forces are based on volunteer recruitment of 
citizens in order to serve in the military without coercion. They choose to be career 
soldiers with secure jobs, regular salaries, career goals and powerful beliefs that they are 
serving for the good of their nations. 
Both the Draft and All Volunteer Forces have deep historical roots, and still shape 
the recruiting methods used in most countries. Nowadays, the decision about which of 
these two models would be more effective, has been an important discussion raised by 
changing security requirements. Every country surely has different requirements and 
expectations concerning national security. However, the key to the right choice is being 
able to establish the optimum balance between requirements and resources. 
Following the establishment of the Republic after the Independence War during 
the World War I era, the Turkish Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting 
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system for a while. After the enactment of the new Draft Law, prepared by the republic’s 
new government, the recruiting system was changed. The new structure and view of the 
Turkish Armed Forces was established, of which, officers and petty officers formed the 
core. Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces has retained the identity established in the 
early years of the republic. 
The military protected the republic and the freedom of Turkish citizens under the 
leadership of Ataturk in the post World War I era. During that time, the threat level was 
always high, and a draft system was indispensable. Furthermore, with the coming of 
World War II and the Cold War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. In 
today’s environment, it can still be considered that Turkey is situated in one of the most 
problematic security areas in the world. 
However, times have changed. The Cold War era is over. Also, rapidly improving 
technology, changing economic structures and evolving needs of the country have 
consequently lead researchers to investigate alternatives to conscription such as the AVF. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to examine and analyze the Draft versus All 
Volunteer Forces (AVF) for the Turkish Armed Forces by reevaluating the rationale for it 
in terms of economic and national security issues, and their effects on the benefits and 
disadvantages of the AVF. Accordingly, the primary research question is as follows. 
“How well do All Volunteer Forces (AVF) fit the Turkish Armed Forces in terms 
of economic and national security issues based on the comparison with the AVF in the 
United States?” 
C. METHODOLOGY AND THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The information and data regarding the draft forces in contemporary Turkey will 
be analyzed to define cost elements of both models, as well as to determine the benefits 
(or efficiencies) and disadvantages of the AVF for the Turkish Armed Forces. 
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In order to answer the research question, the inquiries and analysis will focus on, 
but not be limited to, the specific areas of economic and national security issues 
regarding the draft versus the AVF in the Turkish Armed Forces: budgetary costs, 
opportunity costs, tax distortions, manpower efficiency, readiness of the Armed Forces in 
accordance with the strategic situation of Turkey and its armed forces and the quality and 
eligibility of military manpower, collected from the draft forces enforced in Turkey and 
the AVF in the United States. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this MBA project report may help determine how well the All 
Volunteer Forces (AVF) model fits the Turkish Armed Forces. Furthermore, it may help 
clarify the manpower needs of the 21st century’s Turkish Armed Forces. In addition, 
methodology for acquiring those manpower resources in terms of economic and national 
security issues by analyzing the comparison between the draft forces enforced at the 
present time in Turkey and the AVF in the United States are also discussed. 
Finally, according to the results of this study, the research question stated above 
will have been answered and which will hopefully contribute to the ongoing discussion of 
the best method to recruit manpower for the Turkish Armed Forces. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
The following chapters study the feasibility research and analysis of the All 
Volunteer Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces based on national security and economic 
issues. 
Chapter II presents an extensive background and literature review focusing on the 
Draft and the All Volunteer Forces.  
Chapter III highlights the strategic situation in which Turkey and the Turkish 
Armed Forces has been facing. 
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Chapter IV discusses and presents a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer 
Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Finally, Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the research and study, proposes 
recommendations and potential areas for further research. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Draft and All Volunteer Forces, which have extensive backgrounds, continue to 
be the principal methods of recruiting in most countries. The relative effectiveness of 
these two models has been an important national security issue in those countries. While 
every country has different requirements and expectations about its national security, the 
key is to establish the optimum balance between requirements and resources. 
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the Independence War 
during the World War I era, The Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting 
system for a while. After the republic’s new Draft Law of 1927 (Code No 1111), the 
recruiting system was changed; the new structure of the Turkish Armed Forces was 
established with officers and petty officers forming the core. Currently, the Turkish 
Armed Forces have preserved this identity in the manner in which it was established. 
In the early 1900’s when the threat was always high, a draft system was 
indispensable. Furthermore, with the upcoming World War II and the following Cold 
War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. Today’s Turkey is still located in 
one of the most problematic areas of the world. 
However, after the end of the Cold War, due to rapidly improving technology, 
changing economic structures and the needs of the country have consequently been 
causing researchers to investigate other alternatives such as the AVF system which has 
received renewed attention. 
B. DRAFT FORCES 
1. First Implementations 
The draft system features compulsory enrollment for service in the armed forces 
rather than inducing them to join voluntarily. The first implementation of the draft 
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occurred in the modern state system in revolutionary France. However, systems based on 
obligatory military service occurred in previous eras. 
Also in military history, the Constitution of Italy called “nove di ordinanza e 
militia” is an example of one of the first draft forces which was originally advocated in 
the 16th century by Machiavelli. All Florentine men between the ages of 18-30 could be 
called for military duty. This system may seem comprehensive, however, the 
enforcement of the law was restricted to men working in the agricultural sector. 
Moreover, even in Toscana where implementation took place, care was taken that 
agricultural production would not be disturbed.1 
The Draft was not limited to Toscana. The forerunners were the establishment of 
mandatory service in the French Navy, enforced by Jean Baptiste Colbert, and similar 
systems implemented by Hesse in Hannover.2 
2. Draft Forces in the Modern Military History 
The first implementation of the modern draft system occurred in the 1793 
Convention in France. 
Article 1: From this moment, until that in which the enemy shall have 
been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent 
requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go to battle; 
the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women 
shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children 
shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public 
places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred 
of kings and the unity of the Republic.3 
The most important reason for draft forces, known as “Levee en Masse,” was the 
French Republic’s situation in those times. At the end of the 18th century, France was 
                                                 
1 Demirhan Erdem et al., trans., Modern Stratejinin Yaraticilari (Ankara: Asam Stratejik Arastirmalar 
Merkezi Yayinlari, 2003), 9-10. 
2 M. Tanju Akad, trans., Devletin Silahlanmasi: Ortadogu’da ve Orta Asya’da Zorunlu Askerlik 
(Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2003), 12. 
3 Demirhan Erdem et al., trans., Modern Stratejinin Yaraticilari (Ankara: Asam Stratejik Arastirmalar 
Merkezi Yayinlari, 2003), 71. 
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about to collapse under enemy attack. The government looked for solutions, and 
consequently, decided to institute draft forces in order to mobilize the manpower it 
needed to defeat its enemies. After the establishment of the draft forces, the government 
managed to recruit approximately 600,000 men.  This was far more than any other 
European country at that time. 
However, the draft system, in practice, was not fully enforced until 1798 with the 
Jourdan Law. After 1793, the revolutionary movement started to falter with serious 
declines in the level of military recruitment.4 
3. Nationalist Government Movements 
The success of the French draft forces induced other European countries to 
change to conscription: 1812-Sweden, 1814-Norway and Prussia, 1831-Spain, and 1849-
Denmark.. Later, it spread worldwide.5 
Reasons other than just the military motivated an increase in the use of draft 
forces. Although volunteer forces had been quite common prior to the French revolution, 
conscripted manpower was able to provide national security to a national armed force due 
to rising nationalism. 
At the same time, the role of the draft forces in creating ideal citizens was 
especially valued in the nationalist movements. Although this situation was valid for the 
19th century, the requirement for draft forces was conspicuous in the nationalist 
governments established post World War I and during the establishment of countries 
from former colonies after World War II. Furthermore, while strengthening national unity 
by assigning the responsibility of defense to all individuals, the draft system was 
perceived as a school for citizenship. For example, Revolutionary France was the first of  
 
 
                                                 
4 M. Tanju Akad, trans., Devletin Silahlanmasi: Ortadogu’da ve Orta Asya’da Zorunlu Askerlik 
(Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2003), 13. 
5 Kathy Gill, Military Conscription, Recruiting and the Draft, 
http://www.uspolitics.about.com/od/electionissues/a/draft.htm (accessed May 3, 2007). 
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the nationalist movements in the world. Nationalist governments, established following 
the Revolution, were nations built by patriots with common values. In this system, 
conscript was perceived as integral to national unity.6 
Building nationalism is done with three basic methods. These methods are: school 
(education), armed forces (draft), and election (political attendance). Drafted forces 
defend the precious lands of the country with national unity accordingly strengthened. 
The draft system also performs the role of a citizenship school. Creating recruited 
soldier’s literature is one task associated with this role.7 
4. A New Concept: Total War 
The draft system also changed the conduct of war. Wars were limited to the 
frontlines and took place solely between armed forces before the 1793 Convention. After 
the establishment of the draft system, a brand new concept appeared and continues still: 
Total War. 
Total War is basically the use of all the power of a country against all enemies. 
By definition, Total War requires not only the use of armed forces but all power and 
resources of a country to defeat the enemy. In other words, national defense is not just for 
the military; the entire nation is available for military purposes. Likewise, the political 
and national industrial capabilities can be mobilized to win the war.8 
Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century were the first manifestations of the total war 
concept. Also, World War I and II constitute good examples of this concept. Whole 
nations were aroused for war. Also, unlimitedly, all the resources and capabilities of the 
countries were used in pursuit of victory. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Ozan Erozden, Ulus-Devlet (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayinlari, 1997), 124. 
7 Ibid., 106. 
8 Devletin Kavram ve Kapsami, (Ankara: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi Yayinlari, 1990) 
80-81. 
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5. Draft Forces Today 
Today, Turkey and many other countries (such as Germany, China, Russia, 
Greece, Sweden and Israel) continue the draft system. There are several requirements for 
implementing a draft system successfully. First of all, an effective census of population 
must identify the suitable military. This implies an extensive and effective bureaucracy 
organization outside the armed forces. In order to execute recruitment processes, as well 
as to prevent soldiers going AWOL, draft laws must be enforced. Furthermore, in order 
to provide for the transportation of troops, food, shelter, clothing, armament, healthcare, 
education, and pay for the soldiers, the government must be at an economic level 
sufficient to undertake all these expenses. 
6. The Draft System in Turkey Today 
a. General Principles 
National service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which 
this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the 
Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by law. 
This provision in The Constitution of Turkey (Article 72) makes military 
service mandatory for every male Turkish Republic citizen, as implemented by Law 
Number: 1111 Recruitment Law, 1927. This is also called the Liability System. The 
recruitment period starts at age of 21 and ends at 41 with a total service period of 21 
years. However, this period can be lengthened or shortened up to five years at the request 
of the Chief of Staff, a proposal of DoD and approval by the cabinet.9 
Today’s military service period consists of three phases: Call, Active Duty 
and Reserve. In the Call Phase, the recruiters’ health inspections and deployments are 
completed. This phase includes recruit elimination for health reasons. The Active Duty 
Phase is the period during which military service is performed in schools, battalions, or  
 
                                                 
9 Turkish Republic Recruitment Law, http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er_islemleri/askerlik_kanunu1.htm 
(accessed May 3, 2007). 
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military/government/public organizations. During the Reserve Phase, reserve calls occur 
every year for men who have already completed their military service until the age of 
41.10 
b. Military Service Periods and Types 
Excluding the Coast Guard and Gendarme (which are under the control of 
the Department of Interior) as of 2005, the manpower of the Turkish Armed Forces is 
511,000, of which 442,000 are active duty personnel. The distribution of active duty 
personnel according to services is 373,000 in the Army, 35,000 in the Navy and 34,000 in 
the Air Force (including the officers and petty officers)11 as shown in Figure 1. 
 














Figure 1.   Distribution of Draftees in Turkish Armed Forces (From: The World 
Defense Almanac 2005) 
 
                                                 
10 Military Service Periods, 
http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er_islemleri/gun.kadar%20askerlik%20hiz.htm (accessed May 3, 2007). 
11 The World Defense Almanac 2005, (Bonn: Monch Publishing Group, 2005), 192-194. 
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Active duty service periods in Turkey were last determined in July 2003. 
According to the last regulation, every suitable citizen fulfills his duty according to the 
service types and periods stated below. 
(1) 12 Month Service. As a Second Lieutenant, this is done by 
graduates of universities or faculties lasting four or more years. 
(2) 6 Month Service. As a Non-commissioned Officer or 
Private, this applies to liable citizens eligible for serving as a Second Lieutenant as stated 
above. However, the Turkish Armed Forces recruit the surplus as short-term noncoms or 
privates. 
(3) 15 Month Service as a Noncom or Private. This covers 
liable citizens who are graduates of schools less than four years or lower levels. 
(4) Service in Exchange for Foreign Currency Service. This is 
a right given to people who legally live and work in other countries for at least three 
years. Those who want to exercise this right pay 5,112 Euro and complete 21 days of 
basic military training until they are 38 years old. 
(5) Paid Service.  Paid service is open to liable citizens born 
before January 1, 1973 and who have not yet started military service. This 
implementation was intended to compensate for financial losses from the Golcuk, 
Kocaeli earthquake of August 17, 1999. The ones who want to benefit from this right will 
be counted as completed service. They pay half the amount of 5.112 or 2,556 Euro and 
complete the 21 day basic military training until the age of 40. Those older than 40 years 
of age will fulfill their service obligation if they pay half the amount of 5,112 or 2,556 
Euro without completing the basic military training required. 
c. Draft Forces in Turkey from a Socio-Cultural Stand Point 
(1) Education Mission of Turkish Armed Forces.  Following 
the establishment of the Republic, the values such as modernity, secularism, and 
nationalism (some of the basic principles of the Kemalist national government) gained 
importance in all segments of Turkish society. In those years, the armed forces and 
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schools were designated as the two main institutions for transferring these values to all 
citizens. Accordingly, these two establishments have complemented each other from the 
very beginning of the Republic. It is not a coincidence that the two most emphasized 
titles of Ataturk are the Chief Instructor and the Commander in Chief.12 
Military service provided a unique and peerless educational 
opportunity, especially to youth in the rural areas which had relatively closed societies in 
the building phase of the Republic.13 The main reason for using the Armed Forces to 
accomplish missions not in the principal duties of the Armed Forces is the endeavor to 
fill gaps in the education of citizens. Hence, the propagation of the Kemalist values to 
society as a whole has been one of the most important goals of the Armed Forces. 
Moreover, Article 39 of the Turkish Military Service Code effective in 1935, emphasizes 
that “In addition to military subjects, knowledge, regarding Turkish literature, fatherland 
and life shall be instructed to the soldiers.” 
Today, draftees still receive education activities, with the help of 
multiple institutions, including the departments of the Turkish government, and other 
national and international organizations. 
(2) Military Nation Mentality.  According to the Military 
Nation Mentality, every Turk is regarded as a natural born warrior. The military is not 
only one part of national defense, but also one of the foundations of the socio-cultural 
structure. Turkish history books state that:  
The Turk is the best warrior. The Turkish nation has the most advanced 
military spirit; that means a nation which has experienced a deep, 
immense history of civilizations and cultures. It is certain that Turkish 
nation, which had been an ancestor of all main civilizations since the very 
beginning of mankind, has this spirit in this sophisticated manner.14 
                                                 
12 Aysegul Altinay, “Egitimin Militarizasyonu: Zorunlu Milli Guvenlik Dersi,” in Bir Zumre Bir Parti: 
Turkiye’de Ordu, ed. Ahmet Insel and Ali Bayramoglu (Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 2004), 181. 
13 Tanil Bora, “Ordu ve Milliyetcilik,” in Bir Zumre Bir Parti: Turkiye’de Ordu, ed. Ahmet Insel and 
Ali Bayramoglu (Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 2004), 164-165. 
14 Aysegul Altinay and Tanil Bora, “Ordu, Militarizm ve Milliyetcilik,” in Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi 
Dusunce, Milliyetcilik, ed. Tanil Bora (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), 142-143. 
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Today, military nation values have been internalized by a large 
fraction of society; a military ethos and Turkishness are two integrated concepts in their 
minds. Therefore, military service has been represented as a major social value and made 
mandatory. 
d. Draft Evasion 
Draft evasion and desertion are widespread. The exact number of draft 
evaders is not known, but the number is estimated to be approximately 350,000.15 
According to Article 63 of the Penal Code, draft evasion is punishable (in peacetime) by 
imprisonment of: 
• One month for those who report themselves within seven days, 
• Three months for those who are arrested within seven days, 
• Between three months and one year for those who report themselves 
within three months, 
• Between four months and 18 months for those who are arrested within 
three months, 
• Between four months and two years for those who report themselves after 
three months, 
• Between six months and three years for those who are arrested after three 
months, 
• Up to ten years imprisonment in the case of aggravating circumstances, 
such as self-inflicted injuries and using false documents (Articles 79-81 of 
the Penal Code). 
Desertion is punishable under Articles 66-68 of the Penal Code with up to 
three years imprisonment. Deserters who have fled abroad may be sentenced to up to five 
years imprisonment, and up to ten years in the case of aggravating circumstances (Article 
67 of Penal Code). 
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The monitoring of draft evasion and desertion is strict. The military 
registration number is included on identity documents. Police and gendarme authorities 
are responsible for finding draft evaders and deserters and may conduct house searches 
and arrest them. In addition, they cannot leave the country without their registration 
numbers being checked.16 
There are no detailed figures available on the scale of prosecution of draft 
evasion and desertion, but military courts deal with approximately 60,000 such cases per 
year. About half of these cases reportedly deal with conscripts going absent for less than 
a week, mostly conscripts who do not report back in time after a period of leave.17 
Prison sentences of less than one year imprisonment for evasion of 
registration/examination for enlistment, or for desertion, are generally commuted into 
fines, which must be paid after the end of military service. Sentences for draft evasion for 
periods longer than three months, when the draft evader has not reported himself 
voluntarily, may not be commuted into a fine. Suspended sentences may not be imposed 
for evasion of registration/examination or enlistment or for desertion. Those who are 
convicted of draft evasion must still complete their term of military service. Repeated 
offenders may thus be sentenced again. Prison sentences for repeat offenders may not be 
commuted into fines. Those sentenced to less than six months imprisonment are usually 
confined to military prisons. Those sentenced to over six months are assigned to regular 
prisons. After their prison sentence, they still need to perform the remaining term of their 
military service. 
In addition to the sentences outlined above, Turkish citizens can also have 
their citizenship withdrawn if they live abroad and do not return to perform military 
service within a certain time limit (Article 25(c) of the Turkish Nationality Law No. 403). 
The names of individuals who have forfeited their citizenship are published in the official 
Government Gazette. 
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e. Conscientious Objection 
Conscientious Objector (CO) status does not occur in Turkey. COs may be 
punished under Article 63 of the Turkish Military Penal Code for avoiding military 
service. COs who attract media attention or publish articles about their refusal to perform 
military service may also be punished to between six months and two years imprisonment 
under Article 318 of the Turkish Criminal Code for “alienating the people from the armed 
forces”. In 2004, a new Criminal Code was introduced (Law No 5237).18 Under the 
previous Criminal Code, “alienating people from the armed forces” was punishable under 
Article 155 with a similar term of imprisonment. Thus, a brochure published by the 
Turkish Armed Forces in 1999 states: 
In our laws there are no provisions on exemption from military service for 
reasons of conscience. This is because of the pressing need for security, 
caused by the strategic geographic position of our country and the 
circumstances we find ourselves in. As long as the factors threatening the 
internal and external security of Turkey do not change, it is considered to 
be impossible to introduce the concept of conscientious objection into our 
legislation.19 
C. ALL VOLUNTEER FORCES 
1. A Misperception: Mercenary Force vs. All Volunteer Force 
Since there is a misperception about All Volunteer Forces being a mercenary 
force in Turkey, it is worthwhile to explain the differences between the AVF and 
mercenary forces. In Turkey, the term mercenary force is usually used to describe the All 
Volunteer Forces. However, mercenary is a very different recruitment method. Use of 
mercenary forces depends on the relationship between the government and the national or 
international manpower market.20 Soldiery is basically a job for the mercenary. The 
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motive is the profit gained from the service. Thus, although it seems relatively hard to see 
the difference, mercenaries are individually or comprehensively recruited and they offer 
service to every authority or corporation (or individual) that pays for their service. 
Mercenary forces have been recruited since the beginning of time by the Hittites, 
Assyrians, Israelis, Persians, Macedonians, and Romans.21 However, it is certain that 
mercenary forces as we understand them today, started in medieval Europe, as capitalism 
and monetary economics spread. In that era, labor services were required of villagers in 
less economically developed rural areas.22 
Many powerful countries in Europe used mercenary forces beginning during 
medieval times. In this sense, while local forces were still recruited, mercenary forces 
were called from farther places especially during war time. In the early modern period, 
the Venetians, Spanish, French, Dutch and British were among those who used 
mercenaries. The most arresting aspect of this era is that some of the nations specialized 
in military service such as the Irish, Scottish, Swiss and some German states.23 
Mercenary forces were also very common in the Navy, appearing somewhat later 
in the Army. In early Europe, only the Dutch Republic recruited mercenary forces in its 
Navy. One of the leading forces in that period, the Ottoman Empire’s Navy, also used 
mercenaries who were usually Albanians and Bosnians. As a matter of fact, Mehmed Ali 
Pasha, who was responsible for Egypt, was originally Albanian, Cezzar Ahmet Pasha 
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Nevertheless, especially in reserve forces and privateers, it is certain that 
recruitment was conducted comprehensively via intermediaries. Recruitment of 
privateers was common in both the Muslim and Christian worlds until the 1850’s. The 
best known example in the Ottoman Empire was the recruitment of North Africans by 
privateers in the Ottoman service.25 
Surely, it is possible to find similar mercenaries on land via intermediaries. For 
example, horsemen were recruited in Italy as mercenaries starting in the 14th century. 
Soldiers, known as Condottieri, offered military service to whomever would paid for it.26 
Both the Ottomans and the other European countries frequently used these forces against 
each other. Furthermore, use of the native people on the coasts of the Danube River by 
the Ottomans against western enemies can be considered as another example of 
mercenary forces.27 
However, with the establishment of the national armed forces in the 19th century, 
mercenary forces started to lose their importance and effectiveness, since the need for 
recruiting soldiers with money (or equivalents) substantially disappeared. However, it is 
not right to conclude that it was completely eliminated. Mercenary forces continued to be 
effective during the 19th century’s colonial wars and independence wars in Latin 
America. Following World War II, mercenary forces played an important role in the 
independence and colonial wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Moreover, Southeast 
Asian and American mercenaries financed and trained by the CIA were used effectively 
in the fight against communism in Vietnam. Also, during the 1980’s, American 
mercenaries played an important role against the counter revolution fights in El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.28 
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Certainly, mercenary forces are still in existence today. As a matter of fact, 
American and European mercenaries collaborated with Bosnians and Croatians while 
Russian mercenaries collaborated with Serbians in the Bosnia War. In 1997, the 
government of Papua New Guinea recruited a number of South African mercenaries 
against rebels in the country.29 As a recent example, in the last Iraq war, the United States 
employed private security companies to support its armed forces which are also a form of 
mercenary forces. 
2. Emergence of the System 
The basics of military service requirements were met by mercenary forces in 
Europe during the 18th century. Mercenary forces, which were usually assembled during 
wars and which did not have an effective organization and command structure, 
constituted big problems for militaries. They were poorly trained and profit was their 
only goal. Since they did not have any non-material motives, they could easily retreat 
when their lives were threatened, and they could also change sides according to the 
amount of money they were offered.30 This situation could seriously affect good order 
and discipline. 
At the same time, commanding officers were generally not qualified to manage 
mercenaries as the officers during that period were either aristocrats or also mercenaries. 
For an aristocratic officer, war was nothing but a pursuit of fame and a hobby. 
Consequently, these aristocratic officers had no training.  They commanded soldiers only 
during wartime and could not succeed in their vocation of military service. Therefore, 
despite being good fighters and swordsmen, aristocratic officers frequently did not 
succeed in war.31 
The draft system, which was first established in France, resulted in important 
changes in military practices among European armed forces. This change would also be 
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the starting point of the process for the establishment of modern All Volunteer Forces. 
The establishment of national armed forces not only eliminated the mercenaries, but also 
caused aristocratic officers to be discharged. For the first stage, officer personnel 
requirements for command were met by line officers who cooperated with the 
revolutionaries and middle class intellectuals. However, the new structure of the French 
armed forces demonstrated that it would be difficult to train new officers.32 
At the end of the 19th century, the establishment of the All Volunteer Forces 
started to emerge similar to today’s AVF system. These new soldiers did not serve in 
wartime just because of personal honor or feudal relationships, and they did not serve 
anyone who would pay them. They were soldiers under service to their government. They 
had secure jobs, regular salaries, career goals and powerful beliefs that they were serving 
for the good of their countries and nations. Thus, volunteer soldiers started to work full 
time, and this helped people to see and understand the difference between civil and 
military realms for the first time.33 
3. Grounds for Change 
These circumstances are certainly not enough to explain the development of an 
All Volunteer Forces. Dr. Samuel Huntington stated that some other factors affected the 
establishment of an AVF.34 
First of all, battlefields became more complex because of technical developments, 
which rendered the requirement for a new and more professional military indispensable. 
Furthermore, the rise of nationalist governments caused rival nationalisms. Therefore, it 
was essential for governments to recruit specialist career personnel devoted to their 
countries’ national security. Moreover, changes and developments in democratic ideals of 
the nations brought about the idea of commissioning officers not by birth but in 
accordance with the will of the citizens. Finally, the establishment of only one national 
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authority helped the development of the all volunteer forces. All Volunteer Forces thus 
consist of people who wish to serve the nation. Therefore, All Volunteer Forces will not 
perform efficiently in the absence of national unity.35 
From an economic perspective, debates about the all-volunteer forces often focus 
on limitations reflected in problems of recruitment, retention and personnel costs. Some 
critics advocate a return to conscription which they claim will solve these problems by 
providing an adequate quantity of recruits which would be cheaper than a voluntary 
system. Compared with regular personnel, critics make the point that conscripts are 
relatively cheap, they need little support since they are not accompanied by families and 
they have little leave so that they are almost always available for service. Critics also 
point to the sustainability requirements of modern armies on operations (e.g., peace-
keeping): a modern army requires five or six people on active service for every one 
soldier in the field.36 
Military personnel are a major cost for the armed forces. The recruitment, 
training, retention and efficient utilization of military personnel raises a set of human 
resources issues where economists, and especially defense economists, can apply their 
theories, empirical techniques and critical evaluations of alternative policies. 
Analysis of the draft involved the application of standard microeconomic theory 
comparing market price systems with the draft system. Abolition of the draft made 
military personnel relatively more expensive. Economic theory predicts there will then be 
incentives to substitute relatively cheaper inputs for more expensive inputs. An AVF will 
make military personnel more expensive, leading to substitutions between equipment 
(capital or weapons) and labor, as well as between military personnel and cheaper labor 
inputs (such as civilians and less skilled labor). If defense output remains unchanged, 
defense spending will increase. Other results of an AVF include lower labor turnover 
costs (e.g., training costs), improved motivation resulting in higher productivity, the end 
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of draft-induced uncertainty which distorted the patterns of investments in human capital 
and family planning, and the end of efforts to avoid or defer the draft. The final outcome 
of an AVF would be improved allocation of resources, with the pay of military personnel 
reflecting relative scarcities (their alternative-use value or opportunity cost). Also, the 
draft is criticized as a form of involuntary servitude which imposes in-kind taxes on the 
young adult section of the population.37 
Empirical work has estimated supply functions for military personnel, mostly for 
the United States. Such models usually include a relative pay variable reflecting military 
and civil pay as well as other variables such as civilian unemployment, wars and 
advertising campaigns. Typical relative pay elasticity ranged between 0.5 and 1.0 and 
unemployment elasticity varied between 0.5 and 1.4. Retention is an alternative to 
recruitment, and a study has been made of the cost-effectiveness of re-enlistment in the 
U.S. Navy. Analysis shows that where experienced and inexperienced men are 
substitutes, raising the re-enlistment rate can be cost-increasing.38 
A number of U.S. studies have measured the economic benefits of military 
service. (There are also costs in injuries and deaths) Benefits include training and the 
transferability of the resulting human capital to the civilian economy. A U.S. study of 
nine military occupations found that for transferable skills (e.g., 
electrical/mechanical/electronics equipment repair), military experience was a close 
substitute for civilian experience. For specialized or specific military skills (e.g., combat 
skills), military experience increases civilian earnings, but not at the same rate as civilian 
experience.39 
The new world order following the end of the Cold War has generated a new 
strategic environment. Armed forces have experienced downsizing leading to smaller but 
better equipped forces designed for new roles ranging from war-fighting to peace-
keeping, crisis management, humanitarian aid and disaster relief. New missions demand 
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new skills and new force structures. However, together with smaller forces, the result is 
reflected in a higher number of resignations and difficulties in recruiting. Technical 
progress and continued downward pressure on defense budgets is forcing armed forces to 
re-think some of their traditional methods of doing business, and thus  generating a new 
research agenda for defense manpower economics. Nonetheless, the established 
theoretical and empirical literature remains relevant. Significantly, U.S. economists 
dominate the recent literature and address policy-relevant issues following the end of the 
Cold War.40 
Downsizing at the end of the Cold War led more nations to abolish conscription 
and adopt an AVF. The issue is ultimately empirical and hinges on questions about the 
elasticity of supply, the extent of the external threat, and the productivity differences 
between volunteer and conscripted forces. Subsequently, these qualifications were 
clarified in three propositions. First, because volunteer forces are (usually) more 
productive than draft forces of equal size, conscription need not be the more efficient 
procurement method even if the draft force costs less. Second, the case for conscription 
has probably weakened over time due to improvements to military technology, which 
have served to increase the relative productivity of volunteer forces. Third, the case for 
conscription strengthens when the demand for defense is high, as in times of extreme, 
pervasive threats to national security.41 
More recent studies of the draft have focused on its relationship with the degree of 
unionization in an economy and on the magnitude of its budgetary savings. A public 
choice analysis found a positive relationship between the degree of unionization and the 
presence of the military draft, and thus supporting the hypothesis that unions benefit from 
the draft: the draft protects union members from low-skilled younger competitors. 
Estimates have also been made of the budgetary savings from conscription as part of the  
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debate about burden-sharing in NATO. The results show that the value of conscription as 
a percentage of national military expenditures averaged 9.2% in 1974 and 5.7% in 
1987.42 
Other contributions in the 1990s have dealt with pay and recruitment. According 
to the studies based on pay and benefits (e.g., housing and medical support) as 
components of military compensation, the wage-benefit mix can have a significant and 
predictable impact on hiring, retention, labor costs and the characteristics of individuals 
who constitute the armed forces. According to the quit rates to estimate compensating 
wage differentials in the U.S. military, the U.S. Navy would have to pay wage premiums 
ranging from 4% to 24% to achieve the same re-enlistment as the USAF for single white 
males.43 
Downsizing in the U.S. military in the early 1990s was the basis for a number of 
labor supply and recruitment studies. New insights occurred into the labor supply to the 
U.S. Army and the links between institutional incentives and the effectiveness of 
resources used for recruitment. The findings state that the labor supply for the U.S. Army 
was positively, but inelastically, related to relative pay and unemployment and that 
marginal recruit seemed to be very sensitive to monetary incentives (e.g., enlistment 
bonuses). The problem considered is that of maintaining the U.S. reserve forces in an era 
of military drawdown which will reduce the pool of trained, experienced personnel 
available to the reserves.44 
4. An AVF Precedent: U.S. Armed Forces 
In 1973, the idea of shifting to an all-volunteer force was opposed by most senior 
U.S. military leaders, by many in Congress, and by influential academics. The first 
decade of the new force was rocky and marked by calls to revert to some form of national 
service. 
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During the first three years of the AVF, the services generally met their overall 
requirements for staffing and quality. During those early years, however, the number of 
first-term enlistees who left the service before completing their contracted terms of 
service rose from 26 percent to 37 percent, pushing turnover rates (the annual 
requirement for enlisted recruits divided by the total size of the enlisted force) to nearly 
22 percent—far exceeding the 13 percent anticipated in studies commissioned before the 
change. The high attrition rate meant that more recruits were needed every year than 
anticipated. The constant churning of the force translated into lower levels of experience 
and expertise in units as well as higher costs for recruiting and training. As a result, the 
share of the military budget devoted to personnel actually rose during the first few years 
of the AVF, despite a small reduction in the size of the force. 
The next few years brought the AVF close to crisis. During that period, the U.S. 
economy grew briskly and private-sector wages rose sharply. Military pay raises did not 
keep up, and budgets for recruiting and advertising were cut back. Congress suspended 
the GI Bill, which provided college money for military veterans and had served as an 
important enlistment incentive.45 
During that period, overall force levels were not a big problem. The services 
generally came close to meeting their targets for overall staffing; the largest proportional 
shortfall in total end strength was just 1.2 percent, in 1979. Unfortunately, however, the 
quality of entering personnel plummeted. By 1980, nearly 50 percent of U.S. Army 
enlistees (compared with 28 percent in 1968) fell in the bottom 30 percent of American 
youth in terms of cognitive aptitude, while only 29 percent scored above the median on 
the military entrance test (compared with 49 percent at the end of the draft). Across the 
four services, the proportion of low-scoring enlistees was worse than at any time since 
the Korean War.46 
People with higher cognitive aptitudes do better at most military tasks, people 
whose aptitudes fall in the bottom 30 percent have difficulty acquiring the skills they 
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need to be successful in the military. Thus, the high number of entrants who scored at the 
bottom of the test meant a lower-quality force, more work for trainers and leaders, and 
greater attrition for the entrants (too many of who grew discouraged or were pressed to 
leave when they could not handle their assigned duties). In addition, that period coincided 
with a time of reduced investment in military equipment resulting, some said, in a hollow 
force. Some experts held that problems stemming from reduced investment translated 
into morale problems that compounded the difficulties of getting the AVF started.47 
Fixing the problems cost money, but by the early 1980s, a combination of efforts 
brought the U.S. military out of its transitional problems. Perhaps the most important was 
to raise military pay for recruits and, later, all ranks. Although pay raises lagged during 
the late 1970s, double-digit increases in 1981 and 1982 brought pay levels for most 
military people above the seventy-fifth percentile for people with similar levels of 
education and experience in private-sector firms. Despite the widely reported “pay gap” 
of the late 1980s and the 1990s, military pay continued to compare favorably with pay in 
the private sector throughout the second and third decades of the AVF. Today, U.S. 
military pay raises are explicitly linked to average wage hikes in the private sector.48 
In addition, the United States expanded bonus programs to entice high-quality 
youth to join up and to induce people in critical occupations to reenlist. Following the 
mistaken decision to reduce educational benefits, the nation developed a new program 
that provides generous benefits for service members who wish to go to college or 
technical school after leaving the military. The services were also permitted to design 
educational bonuses of their own, an extra tool to attract people they most want to bring 
in. Money for post-service education proved to be particularly useful in attracting the 
high-aptitude people most likely to be successful in the military.49 
The services also worked to identify and put a stop to traditions that had little real 
military value but annoyed members greatly. Two emotionally charged issues were 
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haircuts and “KP” (kitchen police) duty, which required soldiers to handle menial tasks 
on a routine basis. The issues pitted military commanders and veterans in Congress—
who typically saw military “buzz cuts” and menial tasks as rites of passage supportive of 
good order and discipline—against the desires of recruits, who saw them as lifestyle 
detriments. Ultimately, the desires of recruits won out. While the services still enforce 
haircut standards, they are more relaxed than during the draft era, and KP is largely a 
thing of the past.50 
Another initiative of the American transition was a focus on the quality of life for 
military families. Recruiters emphasized the benefits of family housing, health care, and 
cut-rate groceries, and money was added to budgets to improve the facilities, goods, and 
services that families appreciate. In the late 1980s, the Department of Defense opened its 
own child-development centers to provide subsidized, high-quality child-care services on 
military bases. The initiative probably paid off in improved recruiting and retention. It 
also had a side effect that raised costs for the military, and complicated things for both 
commanders and the people who serve, that is, the proportion of military people with 
young families grew.51 
In addition, the United States greatly expanded the pool from which talented 
recruits might be drawn by removing a 2 percent limit on the share of women in the 
forces, opening numerous jobs to women and transforming the conditions under which 
women serve. The proportion of women in the force rose from 1.9 percent in 1972 to 9.3 
percent in 1983 and has since climbed to about 15 percent. The proportion of minorities 
who serve also increased, as individuals found better opportunities in the military than in 
the private sector.52 
Finally, the military built a professional cadre of recruiters and invested heavily in 
marketing research and mass-media advertising. The general sales pitch emphasized the 
training and other opportunities the military can offer, plus a rich array of family benefits, 
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good pay, a chance for an adventurous and yet more ordered life, as well as patriotism, a 
chance to be part of something important, and other intangibles. Increased advertising 
and recruiting can be the quickest and most cost-effective means to improve recruitment 
levels, which typically lag when the state of the economy improves.53 
a. Improving Cost Effectiveness from U.S. and NATO Perspectives 
Whatever a nation’s reasons for suspending conscription, AVF advocacy 
has raised expectations that abolishing conscription would ultimately lead to improved 
military effectiveness and lowered personnel costs, and thus narrowing the transatlantic 
capabilities gap. At first glance, the numbers seem compelling. In 2000, the United States 
spent just 27 percent of its military budget on personnel, compared with 34 percent in 
1970, before the advent of the AVF. Today, countries with AVFs generally devote 
smaller shares of their budgets to personnel expenditures and larger shares to developing 
and purchasing new equipment than do those that retain conscription. For example, taken 
together, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—three NATO countries 
with long-standing AVFs—devote 28 percent of their total defense budgets to 
modernization. In contrast, the combined share of defense budgets dedicated to 
modernization in all the other countries of NATO comes to just 16.6 percent.54 Figure 2 
gives the number of active duty troops in NATO countries. 
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Figure 2.   Active-Duty Troops of Selected NATO Countries (From: Transatlantic 
Roundtable 2003: Filling NATO's Ranks: Military Personnel Policies in 
Transition) 
 
A somewhat more focused example compares NATO Europe’s three 
biggest spenders: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. While the three countries’ 
total defense budgets are roughly similar, Germany keeps more people under arms than 
the other two countries. Of the three, only Germany still has conscripts. France ended 
conscription in 2001 and is still in the throes of transition. Germany’s conscripts add to 
the size of the Bundeswehr and at the same time drain money that would otherwise be 
available for modernization, with the result that Germany spends only one-quarter as 
much money on equipment modernization per active duty service member as the United 
Kingdom.55 Figure 3 gives modernization spending per active duty service member in 
selected countries. 
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Figure 3.   Modernization Spending per Active-Duty Service Member (2002) (From: 
Transatlantic Roundtable 2003: Filling NATO's Ranks: Military Personnel 
Policies in Transition) 
 
More generally, the U.S. experience appears to validate the arguments 
made in favor of all-volunteer forces on the basis of economic efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. Nevertheless, both the U.S. experience of the middle to late 1970s and the 
early indications from Europe suggest that the transitions in Europe will be at least as 
difficult as in United States.56 
5. All Volunteer Forces Today 
Today, many countries’ recruitment systems are based on All Volunteer Forces 
system. In the early 2000’s, major countries with All Volunteer Forces are the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Also, European Union 
countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Latvia have tried to change their military 
structure to an All Volunteer Force system. Thus, the establishment of an AVF has been 
quite typical at the beginning of the 21st century.57 
It is certain that all of the countries that have been working on a change to an 
AVF, or an AVF in place have certain economic developmental levels. Besides, they use 
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their armed forces in international operations rather than the past national defense 
mentality. This is not a simple coincidence. Thus, an AVF cannot be observed in third 
world countries today, because of economic concerns and problems, as well as certain 
security risks. 
6. First Interferences for Change in Turkish Armed Forces 
Even though draft systems have been in existence for centuries, All Volunteer 
Forces have been one of the most important topics on today’s policy agenda for the 
Turkish Armed Forces. Recruitment of specialist sergeants since 1986 can surely be 
considered as the first serious initiative for establishing an All Volunteer Forces in 
Turkey. Thus, it was stated in the rationale of the 1986 law that the recruitment of 
specialist personnel was essential and cost efficient as stated below; 
…Because of today’s rapidly developing technology, it has been essential 
to equip the armed forces with expensive weapons and equipments and the 
Turkish Armed Forces has happened to use more highly developed 
technologies. Together with the difficulties in training the personnel for 
the technical specifications of these expensive equipments in only 3 
months, the damages and losses which would be followed by misusing 
these equipments would also be quite high. Because of the shortage in the 
staff of officers and petty officers, sergeants were used especially in these 
technical duties until now. However, sergeants who haven’t had enough 
knowledge and experience on these areas could not be efficient in 
operating and maintaining these equipments on the operations. On the 
other hand, in country’s civilian industry sector, the need for technician 
personnel has been increasing day by day and this also leads to shortage in 
technician personnel in the armed forces because of early retirements or 
resignations in order to work in civilian sector for higher incomes… Our 
country’s geopolitical position requires employment of more powerful and 
experienced personnel… While evaluating the additional burden of the 
specialist personnel to the defense budget according to this proposal, the 
savings that would be gained in result of employing specialists should be 
taken into account. With this approach to the issue, the benefits in result of 
use and maintenance of the expensive equipments by specialists will be 
higher than the employment costs and continuity and efficiency will be 
provided in training of the personnel and preparing the equipments and 
weapons to war…58 
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However, it will be helpful to mention some of the past attempts for this new 
method from which intended efficiency could not be received. 
The first step for an AVF was Code No 5430, the law pertaining to the training of 
specialist sergeants, established in 1949. The rationale for this law, prepared by the 
Department of Defense, was the recruitment of engine technicians and operators who 
would operate and maintain newly fielded weapon systems and the new structuring of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. The law authorized the Department of Defense to train the 
privates and the new specialist sergeants who would want to join the armed forces. 
Another step taken toward an all volunteer system was Code No 6320, the Law of 
Sergeants and Specialist Sergeants established in 1954. Rationale for this law, also 
prepared by the Department of Defense, was to correct the deficiencies regarding the 
training of specialist sergeants, dating from 1949 (Code No 5430). With the new law, the 
period required to select specialists was lengthened, and additional regulations were put 
in place to make the job more attractive to the target market. 
The most attention-getting step for change was the additional article to the 
Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law (Code No 4678) in 2001. This new regulation 
allowed the Turkish Armed Forces to employ contractual officers in special areas with 
special needs. 
Certainly, these laws and regulations are important steps toward the establishment 
of an all volunteer forces. However, it cannot be said that these regulations lead to their 
intended results. In the laws with Code No’s 5430 and 6320, attractive conditions for the 
prospective applicants could not be created, and in the law for contractual officers (Code 
No 4678), regulations for the implementation of the law could not be put in place 
effectively. Consequently, current initiatives toward a volunteer system have not been 
fully successful due in large part to existing regulations. 
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III. TURKEY’S STRATEGIC SITUATION, DEMOGRAPHICS 
AND ECONOMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the Independence War 
during the World War I era, the Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting 
system for a while. After the republic’s new Draft Law of 1927 (Code No 1111), the 
recruiting system was changed; the new structure of the Turkish Armed Forces was 
established with officers and petty officers forming the core. Currently, the Turkish 
Armed Forces have preserved this identity in the manner in which it was established. 
In the early 1900’s when the threat was always high, a draft system was 
indispensable. Furthermore, with the upcoming World War II and the following Cold 
War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. Today’s Turkey is still located in 
one of the most problematic areas of the world. 
However, after the end of Cold War due to rapidly improving technology, 
changing economic structures and the needs of the country have consequently been 
causing researchers to investigate other alternatives such as the AVF system which has 
received renewed attention. 
This chapter highlights the Turkish strategic situation with special consideration 
given to demographic changes and its economic growth. 
B. TURKEY’S STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 
During the Cold War, the Turkish security environment was mostly shaped by its 
proximity to the Soviet Union. Soviet territorial demands in 1945 and the threat of 
communism compelled Turkey to seek Western support for its defense. Once Turkey 
joined NATO in 1952, Turkish security policies were conducted mostly in parallel with 
NATO's allies. 
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The sole exception was Turkey's conflict with Cyprus and Greece. In 1974, 
Turkey intervened to ensure the security of the Turkish community. Greek policies in 
regard to Cyprus, the delineation of the Aegean Sea and the militarization of the Greek 
islands adjacent to the Turkish coast were perceived as threats. As a result, Turkey 
developed some security policies independent of NATO. 
During this period, as retired Air Force General Sadi Erguvenc noted, the Middle 
East was not a priority in Turkish security calculations. However, the Cold War's end 
created a dramatically altered environment, leaving Turkey in the midst of two zones of 
instability: the first stretching from the Arctic Circle down through Eastern Europe, the 
Balkans and the Middle East, and the second along the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean. In contrast to the Cold War era, Turkey has become a geopolitically 
unique country, bordering several regions that are very different from each other, and 
thus, posing a variety of security challenges.59 
European territories make Turkey a Balkan country. The largest Turkish city and 
a significant proportion of its population and industry are located in Europe. For 
historical, religious and ethnic reasons, Turkey has strong ties to the Balkans. 
Turkey is also a Black Sea country. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's trade 
and economic cooperation with countries around the Black Sea has expanded 
significantly. 
Turkey also has close ties to a large number of Muslim and Turkish communities 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Over the last few years, Turkey's relations with these 
countries have acquired growing political, economic, and security importance. 
Finally, Turkey is a Middle Eastern country whose security as well as stability 
and prosperity have become intimately tied to developments in the Middle East. 
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1. Changing Environment after the Cold War and Turkey’s Geopolitical 
Role 
The end of the Cold War did not improve Turkey's security environment. New 
threats and challenges dictated a broader security agenda. Despite initially positive 
expectations, disintegration of the Soviet and Yugoslavian federations and, (not least) the 
de facto partition of Iraq caused increased insecurity for Turkey. Moreover, the terrorist 
PKK’s armed insurgency gained momentum after Baghdad’s authority broke down in 
northern Iraq. It remained the epicenter of Turkey’s security concerns for the 1990’s. As 
a result, the “asymmetrical” and “non-conventional threat” required the army to change 
its mindset, force structure, operational codes and even its weapons inventory.60 
Turkey’s vital place in the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve. The 
country’s size, geographic position and powerful armed forces ensure that its significance 
is well understood. During the Cold War, Turkey was regarded as a reliable partner and a 
bulwark of the West because of its proximity to Russia. In more recent years, its position 
connecting Europe to the Middle East makes it an equally valued strategic partner. 
Recently, however, there has been anxiety expressed that the West might lose Turkey. 
Opinion polls, for example, the Transatlantic Trends survey conducted by the German 
Marshall Fund, regularly reveal hostility to the United States in Turkey. Turkish attitudes 
to the European Union have also soured, as negotiations over accession have run into 
trouble. 
Nevertheless, for the moment, military relations between Turkey and the United 
States and NATO remain close. Turkey also has a close strategic relationship with Israel. 
After a major debate, Turkey agreed to deploy peacekeepers to Lebanon. With over a half 
million active troops and a potential for one million men under arms, Turkey has the 
largest armed forces by far in Europe. It is believed that if Turkey does eventually join 
the European Union, it will go a long way towards solving the major difficulty with the 
EU’s nascent “security and defense policy”: a lack of deployable manpower. Turkey is 
also potentially crucial in alleviating Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies 
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and pipelines. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline earlier this year 
allows the transport of oil to the Mediterranean Sea without passing through Russia or 
Iran. A major gas pipeline has long been mooted along a similar route. On the other hand, 
a gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey is already up and running and the Russians are keen 
to expand it. Bringing Turkey into the European Union could clearly play a big role in 
mitigating European energy and military anxieties. However, whether the EU will regard 
extending its frontiers to the borders of Iraq and Syria as a strategic boon remains to be 
seen.61 
a. Post September 11 Impacts 
Turkey has traditionally been an important country because of its 
geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia with it easy access to 
strategically important regions and major energy resources. Moreover, thanks to its 
character as a democratic country with a majority Muslim population, Turkey stands 
culturally as a bridge between Western and Islamic civilizations. 
Turkey's strategic value became more visible following the events of 
September 11. Turkey and Turkish foreign policy started to receive greater interest, and 
the tenor of discussions about Turkey and its strategic importance was usually optimistic. 
The first effect of September 11 was growing acceptance toward the 
Turkish approach to the fight against terrorism. Turkey itself had long struggled against 
separatist terror and politicized Islam in a domestic context. Since the 1970s, Turkey has 
fought against terrorism, and continues to be one of the major targets of terrorist 
activities, both at home and abroad. 
Besides trying to raise the terror issue in several political and diplomatic 
fora, Turkey did not hesitate to employ the military instruments as well. To meet the 
rising challenge of separatist terror in the South Eastern Anatolian region, Turkey 
employed a stubborn, and at times harsh, policy based predominantly on military 
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measures intended to, first stop the terror activities conducted by the PKK, and then root 
out the terrorist groups and their support bases. Emphasis on the use or threat of force 
outside Turkish borders was a logical correlate of this policy. Numerous Turkish 
incursions into northern Iraq are cases in point. The authority vacuum which emerged 
after the imposition of a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq enabled the PKK to use the region 
as a base for terrorist attacks on Turkish territory. Based on a somewhat complicated 
mixture of hot pursuit and an expanded interpretation of the right of self-defense, Turkish 
armed forces were dispatched into Northern Iraq to destroy PKK guerillas and training 
camps and to PKK on Turkish soil. While some of those operations were limited in 
scope, some were large scale involving thousands of troops. At times, 35,000 Turkish 
soldiers crossed the border backed by tanks, artillery, and helicopters.62 
b. Changing Security Perceptions 
The dynamics of Turkish politics have been transformed since Turkey 
received EU candidate status in December 1999. Increasing prospects of EU membership 
have exerted a tremendous impact on Turkish foreign policy. This impact arguably had 
multiple roots. First, in accordance with the EU’s inclination towards vertical integration, 
Turkey’s security and foreign policy environment has diversified at an unprecedented 
pace. Turkish society has become more receptive to open debate as interest groups 
developed, and they are now far better organized to pursue their agendas across Europe 
through peer associations within the Union.63 
Increasing involvement of non-state actors in the formulation of security 
and foreign policy in Turkey has become one of the new aspects of domestic politics. As 
newly emerging groups begin to exert influence over security and foreign policy issues, 
the official apparatus has lost its predominance in economic and financial affairs. Foreign 
policy from below or grass-roots statecraft has its own manifestations in Turkey. 
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Globalization, the EU integration process and customs union brought about their own 
effects on Turkish statecraft. A vast spectrum of civic organizations are involved in 
activities formerly pertinent to the security sector and are thus becoming the agents of a 
de-securitization process in Turkey. Their impacts are becoming visible in debates as to 
how the national interest may best be defined. These new actors supported those who 
pursued revisions in major national policies. As was the case with Cyprus, traditional 
circles have failed to mobilize large sectors of society to support their positions.64 
It was, therefore, not a coincidence that debate over national interest 
undermined the state’s position on one of the issues that was traditionally considered a 
major national cause: Cyprus. Stated briefly, the debate over Cyprus undermined the case 
for Turkey that it was keeping its troops for the sake of Cypriot Turks. The revised 
version of the argument, however, asserted that Turkey’s presence had been required for 
Turkey’s own security needs. Thus, the new approach required the policy be further 
securitized. It is beyond the scope of this project to delineate the details of the Annan 
Plan, yet the end result was an impressive compromise among contending agents of the 
security and foreign policy. The compromise gave more freedom of maneuver to the new 
AKP government. A diplomatic initiative taken by the AKP government led to the April 
2004 referendum, redefining all the parameters of the Cyprus imbroglio and freeing 
Turkey from the role of scapegoat for the post-1974 stalemate on the island.65 
Second, Ankara would definitely like to avoid any conflict with its 
neighbors because it would obviously be to the benefit of those who claimed that 
Turkey’s EU accession should be delayed because its neighborhood was still perilous. 
The way certain sections of the Turkish polity stood against U.S. unilateralism on Iraq 
was bolstered, if not inspired, by the EU's stand on the issue. The Turkish position on 
Iran and Syria also seems influenced by Brussels. With EU accession in mind, observed 
an expert, Turkey wanted to treat its Middle Eastern neighbor’s à la Europe.66 
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So truly, given that both Iran and Syria became de facto neighbors of the 
United States after the occupation of Iraq, the treatment à la Europe has paid more 
dividends. Therefore, the possibility of Turkey’s unilateral intervention in regional affairs 
will be limited by further Europeanization of its security and foreign policy sector.67 
Consequently, having said all of these facts regarding national security 
concerns of Turkey in this rapidly changing security environment, Turkish military 
should be and “is” moving to modes of combat requiring a high degree of soldier skills. 
2. Turkish National Defense Strategy 
The Turkish Defense Policy and Military Strategy, presented in Appendix, are 
officially declared by the Ministry of Defense and highlight some of the basic principles 
as follows: 
Turkey’s National Defense Policy: 
…At the end of the Cold War and the struggle between blocks, there was a 
search for a new world order directed at globalization, which also changed 
the concepts of threat. While the concept of threat was previously evident 
and large at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has become multi-
directional, multi-dimensional and variable and instabilities dominate the 
environment. The traditional concept of threat has now started to contain 
new threats and risks emerging in the form of: 
– Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
– Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, 
– Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, 
– Religious fundamentalism, 
– Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and 
– International terrorism. 
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Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, 
Caucasus and the Middle East, where the new threats and risks are 
concentrated. Turkey is in a region where the interests of the global 
powers and formations intersect. This situation, stemming from Turkey’s 
geo-strategic location, has not changed until the present and will not 
change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that the importance and 
place of Turkey in the new world order will become even more 
strengthened… 
Turkey’s Military Strategy: 
Turkey’s Military Strategy contains four important matters to be able to 
support the specified defense policy: 
– Deterrence, 
– Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in Crises, 
– Forward Defense and 
– Collective Security… 
…The formation of a force structure conforming to the defense policy and 
strategy, of which the main principles are summarized above, is of great 
importance. For Turkey to attain a military power having the resources 
and capabilities of supporting the National Security Policy of Turkey, 
which is subject to multifaceted threats due to her geopolitical and 
geostrategic position, maintaining and developing this force according to 
the requirements of the conditions and the period, constitute the basis for 
Turkey’s Defense Policy and Strategy in the twenty-first century.68 
C. TURKEY’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. Overview of Turkey’s Demographics for the Eligible Manpower Pool 
According to the composition of the population, total military manpower 
availability in Turkey is approximately 17 million while the fraction suitable for military 
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service is approximately 14 million as of 2005 (excluding the female population under 
the current constitution). However, since Turkish Armed Forces have already deployed 
female officers in the military, in the case of an AVF option, it seems obvious that some 
portion of draftees will be enlisted from the female population.69 
Consequently, the total (male and female) military manpower available in Turkey 
is approximately 33 million while the fraction suitable for military service is 
approximately 26 million, which indicates a relatively large population compared to the 
other countries with AVF. The current military manpower pool is shown in Table 1. 
 
Military branches: Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Turkish Land Forces, Turkish Naval Forces, Turkish Air Force 
Military service age 
and obligation: 20 years of age 
Manpower available 
for military service: 
males age 20-49: 16,756,323 
 
females age 20-49: 16,051,706 (2005 est.) 
Manpower fit for 
military service: 
males age 20-49: 13,905,901 
 
females age 20-49: 13,335,812 (2005 est.) 
Manpower reaching 
military service age 
annually: 
males age 18-49: 679,734 
 
females age 20-49: 659,090 (2005 est.) 
Military expenditures 
as percent of GDP: 5.3% (2005 est.) 
Table 1.   Military Manpower Pool in Turkey (From: CIA The World Fact Book) 
 
2. Turkish Economy 
Turkey's economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along 
with traditional agriculture that still accounts for more than 35% of employment. It has a 
strong and rapidly growing private sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic 
industry, banking, transport, and communication. The largest industrial sector is textiles 
                                                 
69 The World Fact Book, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html#Military 
(accessed February 24, 2007). 
 42
and clothing, which accounts for one-third of industrial employment, it faces stiff 
competition in international markets with the end of the global quota system. However, 
other sectors, notably the automotive and electronics industries are rising in importance 
within Turkey's export mix.70 
The Turkish economy has done extremely well in recent years. In 2005, its 
growth was approximately 7.5%, following a growth of approximately 8% in 2004. 
Encouragingly, Turkey managed to withstand a mini-crisis when emerging markets 
sagged and inflation rose unexpectedly in 2006. In previous times, such events might 
have led to a full-scale financial crisis such as the one in 2001. However, the Turkish 
economy held steady.71 
Turkey is currently growing much faster than the European Union average driven 
in part by rising productivity, increasing exports, and a recent influx of foreign direct 
investment. Only a stagnating services sector seems to have held back recent 
performance. Nevertheless, the country’s economic success story is not just high growth. 
Inflation, which has bedeviled the country in the past, is now largely under control at 
around 5%. Moreover, government finances are also in much better shape. The 
government is now running a primary surplus helped by sharp cutbacks in agricultural 
subsidies. The biggest macro economic worry is Turkey’s very large current account 
deficit.72 
Agriculture remains a huge sector, accounting for almost a third of jobs and 
around 12% of the GDP. However, Turkish citizens are steadily drifting off the land, and 
moving to urban locations. With an estimated 25% of the population under the age of 15, 
the labor force will be fast-growing and youthful for years to come. Thus, 
competitiveness may depend on the ability not only to provide education for its young 
population, but also to create job opportunities. In addition, unemployment remains at 
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double-digit percentages, while employment growth has been estimated at less than 1% 
per year currently. The government itself has calculated that Turkey needs to create some 
500,000 new jobs a year in order to keep the unemployment rate constant.73 
Fortunately, the Turkish private sector is strong and growing. The government has 
pressed ahead with a major program of privatization, including the sale of Turk Telecom 
and Tupras, an oil refiner. Banks have also been privatized and have attracted a lot of 
foreign interest. Major recent investors in Turkey include Fortis of Belgium and National 
Bank of Greece. Turkish banks and finance houses are well positioned to serve as a 
regional hub for business from the Middle East and the Caspian region. As a result of 
successful privatizations and the growth of the private sector, the three biggest Turkish 
companies are now privately-held. Turkey is internationally competitive in a number of 
important business sectors, including textiles, financial services and automobiles. Toyota 
and Ford are both major exporters from Turkey.74 
Prior to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey averaged less than $1 
billion annually, but recent economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU 
membership boosted FDI up to $9.7 billion.75 Total privatization sales since 1985 are 
currently approaching $26 billion.76 Oil began to flow through the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline in May 2006, marking a major milestone that will bring up to 1 million barrels 
per day from the Caspian region to market. 
Tourism is also booming. The country welcomed 21 million tourists in 2005 and 
the number of arrivals has grown by over 20% for the last two years. Turkey’s three 
biggest markets are Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. However, in tourism, as 
in so many other areas of the economy, Turkey will depend on an open and friendly  
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relationship with both Western Europe and the Middle East. As a bridge between East 
and West, the country could be unusually vulnerable to any escalation in international 
tensions.77 
Some important points regarding Turkish economy which should be taken into 
consideration are shown in Table 2. 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Subject                                      
Gross domestic product 459.8 420.9 453.9 492.9 551.9
GDP per capita 6816 6135 6520 6971 7687
Size of GDP in million 
US Dollars 
Volume index of GDP per 
capita 27.5 24.9 26.3 27.1 28.3
Evolution of GDP Real GDP growth 7.36 -7.495 7.942 5.794 8.931
Gross fixed capital formation 22.353 18.165 16.588 15.46 17.821Investment rates 
Gross fixed capital 
formation: housing 5.259 5.238 3.821 3.152 3.461
Inflation GDP deflator 49.9 54.81 44.13 22.51 9.85
Value added in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing 14.19 11.736 11.672 11.903 11.454
Value added in industry, 
including energy 23.482 25.021 25.454 25.094 25.338
Value added in construction 5.245 5.039 4.143 3.578 3.64
Value added in transport, 
trade, hotels and restaurants 34.423 35.753 35.529 35.369 35.672
Value added in banks, 
insurance, real estate and 
other business services 8.471 8.252 8.934 9.194 9.467
Macroeconomic 
trends 
Value added by activity
Value added in government, 
health, education and other 
and personal services 
14.19 14.198 14.268 14.863 14.429
CPI: all items 100 154.4 223.825 280.444 310.127
CPI: food 100 149.082 223.001 282.781 304.251
Consumer price indices 
(CPI) 
CPI: energy 100 192.194 279.94 337.063 361.148
Prices 
Producer price indices 
(PPI) 
PPI: manufacturing 
100 161.627 242.615 304.634 338.424
Employment rates: total 48.897 47.799 46.708 45.529 46.094
Employment rates: men 71.669 69.324 66.869 65.884 67.875
Employment rates by 
gender 
Employment rates: women 26.163 26.301 26.574 25.193 24.323
Employment rates for age 
group 15-24 36.971 35.282 33.03 30.514 31.56
Employment rates for age 
group 25-54 56.676 55.52 54.621 53.964 54.096
Labor market 
Employment rates by 
age group 
Employment rates for age 
group 55-64 36.404 35.916 35.298 32.705 33.063
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Subject                                      
Part-time employment Part-time employment rates 9.353 6.191 6.597 6.025 6.608
Self-employment rates: total 51.402 52.82 50.246 49.364 49.158
Self-employment rates: men 46.508 47.457 45.113 44.53 44.994
Self-employment 
Self-employment rates: 
women 64.713 66.789 63.019 61.881 60.725
Long-term 
unemployment 
Long term unemployment 
21.093 21.332 29.442 24.384 39.152
Total tax revenue 32.318 35.149 31.083 32.765 ..
Taxes on income and profits 9.544 10.141 7.707 7.766 ..
Total tax revenue 
Taxes on goods and services 13.566 14.096 14.58 16.205 ..
Public finance 
Taxes on the average 
production worker 
Taxes on the average 
production worker 
40.363 43.605 42.485 42.195 42.721
Table 2.   Selected Macroeconomic Trends and Data of Turkish Economy (From: 
OECD Statistical Profile of Turkey on OECD website) 
 
3. Effects of the Draft System on Turkish Economy 
The draft system mandates a proportion of the society to yield their potential 
earnings in favor of the nation. In a sense, an individual citizen’s foregone income can be 
considered a hidden tax, which can also be called a conscription tax. Therefore, when 
analyzing the draft, the question to be considered is whether the cost of defense should be 
paid by all taxpayers or imposed on a group of young people in the military manpower 
pool. The following sections will highlight significant cost elements of the draft system 
on the economy. 
a. Budget Costs 
Budget costs can be calculated simply by multiplying the average wage by 
the number of draftees which will obviously be lower in the draft system compared to the 
AVF option since in an AVF, wages would be calculated on the basis of supply and 
demand variables, more specifically equal to the supply price of the last volunteer 
enlisted. 
According to Figure 4 , W1 is the budget cost and as can be seen, when all 
the eligible manpower pool has to serve, which is the case in the draft system in Turkey, 
budget costs exceed the economic costs in AVF. This point brings up the argument of 
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Proportion of Eligible Manpower Pool 
W1 
W2 
Cooper, who claims that conscription is the standard method of manpower acquisition 
when a country maintains a very large military force relative to its population. However, 
when the proportion of the eligible manpower pool, which has to serve, decreases, budget 
costs will decrease relatively to the economic costs. The difference between wages and 
the supply is defined as the economic rent to the suppliers which brings up another 
decision point: how much economic rent would be acceptable to transfer from taxpayers 
to prospective volunteers.78 
 
Figure 4.   Supply Curve Analysis for Military Manpower Pool  
 
b. Economic or Opportunity Costs 
Opportunity cost, or economic cost, is the cost of something in terms of 
the benefits that could be received from an opportunity foregone, or the most valuable 
forgone alternative (generally second best alternative). Generally, opportunity costs are 
assessed in monetary terms, but can also be assessed in terms of anything that is of value 
to those doing the assessing.79 
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In this case, the supply price of an individual is a good measure which 
combines the individual’s opportunity cost incurred by serving in the military. Figure 4 
again, under the assumption of military requirement as a number of personnel is B and 
W1 is the wage which induces all prospective volunteers to join the military. However, 
when wages decrease to W2, only ‘a’ would voluntarily join the military and the 
remaining portion would be either unwilling to serve or be drafted. 
In the case of Turkey, with its current draft system, the military wage for 
new recruits is very vague. Therefore, if this amount of wage is applied to the graph in 
Figure 4, the whole area below the supply curve will be the opportunity cost of the draft 
system, which is quite large. Moreover, a scenario in which (a) manpower requirements 
decrease, (b) eligible manpower pool increases and (c) skilled (rather than numerous) 
skilled personnel are needed makes the AVF process more efficient for society as a 
whole. Therefore, in order to find the best level for both the government and the 
individuals, the equilibrium is the intersection of supply and demand curves where no 
deadweight loss occurs and social gain is at maximum. 
c. Conscription Tax 
The military draft can be regarded as a tax on both the present and the 
future earnings of the draftees. The discounted value of this tax can be interpreted as a 
human capital burden which alters the stock of human capital from what it would have 
been in the absence of the draft. For this reason, the comparison of draft forces with 
alternative manpower acquisitions has centered on the AVF where the conscription tax is 
zero. 
Conscription tax is basically the difference between the individual 
draftees’ military wages and the wages they desire to join a volunteer based military 
which was called the supply price in the previous sections. Cooper states that the 
conscription tax is a means of income redistribution at the expense of the male 
individuals who have to serve in the military. There are two significant issues related to 




is the intragenerational transfers of income.80 The intragenerational transfer occurs 
because the eligible male population is obliged to serve under law. Since the entire 
eligible male population has to serve in the military, this transfer might be justified. A 
more problematic form of income redistribution is the intergenerational redistribution 
since those who have to serve are carrying the tax, while others avoid it. As a significant 
and simple example, consider two individuals with different income levels of $1,000 and 
$10,000, which is quite possible in Turkey. If drafted, the second individual’s earnings 
would be a lost opportunity to him and a deadweight loss to the Turkish economy. On the 
other hand, if he tries to avoid serving, it will be considered a conscientious objection (a 
crime) in case he finds a way to avoid it legally, and he will be censured by Turkish 
society. In other words, the draft system as currently practiced in Turkey redistributes the 
income from poorer to wealthier, which is also unfair. 
Conscription tax is visualized in Figure 5, 
 
 
Figure 5.   Conscription Tax Visualization  
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W1 = Market value of military wage to attract S1 amount of enlisted personnel. 
W2 = Current military wage 
A = Conscription tax 
B = Total rent (with AVF) 
C = Avoidance cost 
S1 = Number of enlisted military personnel required 
In case the government pays the market price to attract volunteers, it 
would pay the supply price of the last volunteer in the supply curve. The lower group will 
earn a rent equal to the difference between their supply prices and the current military 
wages. When conscription is executed, this rent would be largely lost since everyone 
obtains the same amount and enrollment is mandatory. 
More specifically, in order to ascertain the individual variables of this 
figure, a mathematical model can be used as stated below. 
Expected income (y) of an individual is the sum of 
• the probability of not serving times the supply price less the cost of the 
draft 
• and the probability of having to serve times military wages less the cost 
they incurred to avoid the draft 
(1 )( 1 ) (1 )y p w c p c= − − + −   (1) 
where 
p = Probability of serving 
w1 = Supply price 
c = Avoidance cost 
If simplified, the equation will be, 
1 1y w c pw p= − − +   (2) 
which means an individual can change his/her expected income by controlling c. 
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By differentiating y with respect to c, the optimum income can be 
calculated for an individual whose supply price is higher then the military wage in draft. 
(1 1) 1y p w
c c





∂ =∂ −                 (4)  
A plausible functional form for p(c) is: 
, 0cp e β β−= >                                                                                                                    (5) 
where β  equals a variable controlled by the government that can affect the degree of 
success for an individual who incurs draft avoidance costs. Therefore, if the government 
allows more draft deferments, β  would be larger. Using Equation 5: 
cp e p
c
ββ β−∂ = − = −∂                 (6) 




wβ= −  where (w1-1)>0              (7) 
The appropriate interpretation of cases where Equation 7 implies p>1 is 
that of a corner solution; people who cannot satisfy the condition in Equation 7 are those 
for whom the gains associated with reducing the probability of induction are so small that 
no expenditure to do is justified. These people will simply permit themselves to become 
drafted, or they may even volunteer but they would not do so in the absence of 
conscription. Individuals able to satisfy Equation 7 enter the military only as draftees. 
The avoidance costs spent by individuals can be identified by making 
Equation 5 equal to Equation 7 as follows:81 
[ ]1 ln ln( 1 1)c wββ= + −                (8) 
                                                 
81 Kurt Erdogan, “Feasibility of an All Volunteer Armed Force in Turkey” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2001), 27. 
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IV. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF AVF OPTION FOR 
TURKEY FROM AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1900’s, a draft system was indispensable in Turkey due to major 
military threats. Furthermore, with the coming World War II and the Cold War following, 
drafted armed forces continued to be essential. And, Turkey today is still in one of the 
most problematic security areas of the world. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, rapidly improving technology, and 
changing economic structures, alternatives like the AVF system have received increasing 
attention. 
The transition to an All Volunteer Force is not just a management or manpower 
issue. It has many economic, social and national security related consequences. Although 
there are still debates on the costs and efficiency of an AVF in the United States, the AVF 
without a doubt has shown its effectiveness in the battlefield for the United States so far. 
Such a benefit is invaluable and immeasurable. 
There are two main concerns about the transition to an AVF in Turkey: (a) the 
costs (especially the personnel costs) and (b) the effects of decreasing the number of 
soldiers. 
This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer Forces in the 
Turkish Armed Forces while considering various elements of budget costs and 
opportunity (economic) costs as well as a conscription tax. 
B. BUDGET COSTS OF AVF OPTION FOR TURKEY 
1. Payroll Costs 
Budgetary costs (payroll costs of enlistees) will be considered since they are the 
greatest concern and argument against transitioning to an AVF. Payroll costs can be 
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calculated simply by multiplying the average wage by the number of draftees. This will 
obviously be lower in the draft system since in an AVF, wages would be calculated on 
the basis of supply and demand in the labor market, and more specifically, equal to the 
supply price of the last volunteer enlisted. 
However, as a starting point, several assumptions should be made in order to 
roughly estimate these costs for Turkey. 
• The transformation process to an AVF away from the draft system will be 
ignored. In other words, all current draftees/enlistees will be considered as 
all volunteer active military members. Therefore, enlistment bonuses will 
also be ignored since it will not be realistic to recruit all military members 
at the same time. 
• With the establishment of an AVF system, not all of the eligible 
manpower pool will be recruited –only enough volunteers to meet 
manpower needs. Therefore, a significant reduction in the number of 
enlistees will occur. However, since deciding on the number of enlistees is 
strategic and should be made by the Chief of Staff, the same number of 
current active military personnel, which is 442,000 as stated in Chapter-II, 
will be assumed to be the worst case scenario from a cost perspective. 
• The monthly salary of an enlisted will be assumed to be the lowest 
monthly salary of a civilian government employee which is $600 as of 
2007.82 
• The monthly salary of a draftee will be assumed to be zero since it is 
considered pocket money and quite small. 
• Training expenses will be regarded as fixed since they have been incurred 
in the draft system as well. These would also be less in an AVF because of 
a decreased number of enlistees. 
• Accession processing expenses will also be regarded as fixed since they 
have been incurred in the draft system as well. These would also be less in 
an AVF because of a decreased number of enlistees. 
Under these assumptions, the annual payroll costs of an AVF in Turkey can 
roughly be estimated at $3.2 billion. 
 
                                                 
82 Memurlar Net, http://www.memurlar.net/haber/54038/ (accessed May 3, 2007). 
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However, another consideration is the tax revenues of these salaries, which should 
be considered as savings from the AVF. Based on their income level, enlistees will be in 
the lower tax proportion which is roughly 15% in Turkey. Therefore, net payroll costs of 
enlistees will be $2.7 billion. 
2. Other Cost Considerations 
a. Advertising Costs 
Advertising is critical to recruiting efforts because convincing young 
adults to join the military is difficult. The U.S. Department of Defense has been trying to 
convince more than 200,000 people each year to join the military. To assist in recruiting, 
the military services advertise on television, on radio, and in print and participate in 
promotional activities. The total U.S. Department of Defense advertising budget for fiscal 
year 2004 was $592.8 million83 while the total defense budget was approximately $380 
billion84 at that time which accounts for 0.1% of the total defense budget. 
Turkey’s defense budget is approximately 3.3% of the GDP as of 200785 
which is $15.4 billion. Thus, from the standpoint of the U.S. example, and assuming that 
0.1% of the total defense budget will be spent on recruitment advertising costs, they can 
roughly be estimated as $15.4 million annually for Turkey. However, considering the 
income levels compared to those of the United States and the eligible manpower pool, 
which is approximately 26 million in Turkey, this model can be considered a worst case 
scenario like the model used to estimate payroll costs. 
b. Medical Expenses 
Analyzing medical expenses in the two scenarios, an AVF vs. a Draft, is 
very complicated and should be considered a future research topic. However, it is highly 
                                                 
83 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report-03-1005. 
84 Defenselink News, “Fiscal 2004 Department of Defense Budget Release” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3615 (accessed May 3, 2007). 
85 Turkiye Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi Basin Bulteni, 
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/TR/dokumantasyon/basinbulteni/Pages/20070306.aspx (accessed May 4, 2007). 
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likely that there will be a significant decrease in terms of the burden that the government 
bears with an AVF since the government compensates all medical expenses under the 
current draft system in Turkey. Therefore, there is ample incentive for draftees to visit 
doctors, even for minor problems (for which they would not normally visit a doctor). 
However, in the case of an AVF, since enlistees themselves will likely pay 
a fraction (perhaps 20%) of their medical expenses, which is the rate for government 
employees in Turkey, that would create incentives leading to a decrease in medical 
expenses. 
c. Training Expenses 
Training expenses can be regarded as fixed since they are incurred in both 
the Draft and AVF systems. However, they certainly are going to be less eventually in an 
AVF option because of a decreased number of enlistees. 
d. Accession Processing Expenses 
Accession processing expenses can be regarded as fixed since they are 
incurred in both the Draft and AVF systems. However, they certainly are going to be less 
eventually in an AVF option because of a decreased number of enlistees. 
C. OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF CURRENT DRAFT SYSTEM 
Opportunity (economic) cost is the cost stated in terms of the benefits from an 
opportunity foregone, or the most valuable forgone alternative (generally the second best 
alternative). Generally, opportunity costs are assessed in monetary terms, but can also be 
assessed in terms of anything that is of value to those doing the assessing.86 The 
measurement of opportunity costs is explained in detail in Chapter III. If assumed 
numbers are applied to Figure 6 below, 
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Figure 6.   Supply Curve Analysis for Military Manpower Pool 
 
W1 = Annual income of a draftee = 0, 
W2 = Annual income of an enlisted = $7200, 
B = Required eligible manpower pool for military service = 442,000 (Demand) 
a = Number of people willing to serve in the military if W1 is paid. (It is expected to be 0 
in Turkey’s case since W1 is assumed to be 0.) 
Therefore, the entire area below the supply curve will be the opportunity cost of 
the draft system in Turkey, which is $1.6 billion annually. 
Moreover, in an AVF manpower requirements decrease, and skilled (rather than 
numerous) personnel are needed. Thus, the AVF process becomes more efficient for 
society as a whole. Therefore, in order to find the best level for both the government and 
individuals, it is necessary to meet the equilibrium, which is the intersection of supply 
and demand curves where no deadweight loss occurs and social gain is at maximum. 
D. CONSCRIPTION TAX 
The military draft can be regarded as a tax on both the present and the future 
earnings of the draftees. The discounted value of this tax can be interpreted as a human 









capital burden which alters the stock of human capital from what it would have been in 
the absence of the draft. For this reason, the comparison of draft forces with alternative 
manpower acquisitions has centered on the AVF where the conscription tax is zero. 
Conscription tax is basically the difference between the individual draftees’ 
military wages and the wages they desire to join a volunteer based military. Cooper states 
that the conscription tax is a means of income redistribution at the expense of the male 
individuals who have to serve in the military.87 
If the model built in Chapter-III is applied to the current draft system in Turkey, 
the resulted situation is depicted in Figure 7 below, 
 
Figure 7.   Conscription Tax Visualization 
 
S1 = Number of enlisted military personnel required = 442,000 
W1 = Annual income to attract S1 amount of enlisted personnel = $7200 
W2 = Current annual income = 0 
A = Conscription tax 
                                                 
87 Kurt Erdogan, “Feasibility of an All Volunteer Armed Force in Turkey” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2001), 21. 
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Therefore, specifically in the case of Turkey, the entire area below the supply 
curve until S1 will be equal to the conscription tax, which is $1.6 billion annually. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. BRIEF SUMMARY 
This project has provided a Draft versus an All Volunteer Forces case analysis for 
the Turkish Armed Forces by evaluating the feasibility of the implementation of an AVF 
in the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Chapter II presented an extensive background and literature review focusing on 
past and present Drafts and All Volunteer Forces.  
Chapter III highlighted the strategic situation in which Turkey and the Turkish 
Armed Forces has been facing in terms of national security issues. 
Chapter IV discussed and presented a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer 
Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces from an economic standpoint. 
Finally, Chapter V discussed the conclusions of the research and study, proposed 
recommendations and potential areas for further research. 
B. WHAT TO DO? 
Previous chapters have provided the necessary data and information for a Draft 
versus an All Volunteer Forces (AVF) case analysis for the Turkish Armed Forces by 
evaluating the feasibility of implementing an AVF in the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Drawing upon the information and data about the economy and national security, 
environment and its relation, we have compared the conscripted forces in place in Turkey 
with all volunteer forces (as found, for example in the United States). Those chapters 
have defined the specific cost elements of both models and helped assess the benefits or 
efficiencies, as well as the disadvantages of the AVF. Moreover, they have discussed 
Turkey’s military manpower needs for the 21st century as well as the methods of 
recruiting (and retaining) those manpower resources -in context of Turkey’s current 
economic and national security environment. 
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The post-Cold War security environment has significantly changed the threats 
against Turkey. Today, in addition to the classical homeland defense mission, the Turkish 
Armed Forces must also successfully engage in asymmetric warfare, such as counter-
terrorism, prevention of smuggling and multinational military operations. 
Furthermore, rapidly advancing technology has greatly complicated the battlefield 
environment. This makes even more difficult the operation of new complicated and hi-
tech weapon systems in the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory. Gaining the needed 
proficiencies for effective military operations requires longer and more expensive 
training periods –especially for uneducated and untrained draftees. 
Certainly, one of the major means to meet these new requirements is to recruit 
well educated and trained specialists for the military with All Volunteer Forces as one 
means of doing that. 
Indeed after the Cold War, the Turkish Armed Forces have considered these 
needs and highlighted the recruitment of specialists. In this light, new laws and 
regulations have enabled the recruitment of specialist sergeants and contracted officers, 
especially in the technical and critical fields discussed in Chapter II. 
Furthermore, from an economic standpoint (based on the cost elements analyzed 
and discussed), it can be concluded that an All Volunteer Forces fits into the 
contemporary Turkish economy as well. Moreover, when opportunity costs and the 
conscription taxes are considered, the draft is arguably hurting the Turkish economy and 
the well being of the Turkish people. 
However, there are significant concerns over the transition to an All Volunteer 
Armed Forces in Turkey. First of all, a structural change to an All Volunteer Armed 
Forces will certainly lead to significant personnel reductions in the armed forces. In 
consideration of the security environment which Turkey has experienced since the end of 
the Cold War, such reductions in the armed forces might be taken as sign of weakness. 
However, this problem can be alleviated by acquiring more modern weapon systems, 
keeping the inventory up-to-date. 
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On the other hand, regardless of economic and national security issues, the 
military nation ideal is a significant concern from a socio-cultural standpoint. Most of the 
draftees perceive military service as a duty in terms of the nationalist government 
mentality, established at the very beginning of the Turkish Republic. 
Therefore, a transition to an All Volunteer Armed Forces from a draft would 
certainly not be an easy process. The best strategy for a transition would likely involve 
proceeding step by step. For example, establishment of a joint force with officers, petty 
officers and specialist sergeants that the Turkish Armed Forces already has, can be a 
good point which to start. Such a pilot brigade can be observed and compared to a similar 
brigade with the exact same mission, efficiencies and differences. 
Secondly, new laws and regulations should be put into effect in order to enable 
the recruitment of specialist volunteers-primarily a political issue. Also, from an 
economic standpoint, as already discussed in Chapters II and IV, a significant surplus of 
draftees exists in Turkey, and when the population and expectations regarding said 
population are observed in Chapter III, this surplus is expected to increase. Thus, another 
action should be personnel cutbacks in terms of soldiers, especially draftees. This would 
have the additional advantage of enabling additional basing and support structure 
reductions based on cost and benefit considerations.  
Finally, to diminish the perception of All Volunteer Forces as mercenaries, 
citizens should be well informed through the use of the press. These measures would both 
improve general knowledge of the AVF issue and facilitate recruiting volunteers for 
military service. 
In this study, significant elements regarding both the feasibility and transition to 
an All Volunteer Armed Forces in Turkey were analyzed together with other concerns. 
All these things considered, it can be concluded that an AVF is a viable policy option for 
Turkey now, and may well be a necessity in the near future, as the Turkish security 
environment changes, as the armed forces move increasingly to high-tech systems, and as 
the economy continues to grow. 
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However, there are certainly more issues to consider before reaching a final 
decision regarding a Turkish AVF. Some of them were left out in this study, due to its 
focus on the economic issues, that is, those remaining issues should be deeply researched 
and analyzed. These include the following: 
• A more accurate determination of opportunity costs of draftees, 
specifically the ones with high education and prospects for high income 
• The full cost of draftees, to include shelter, food, medical care, training, 
and the inefficiencies associated with less-skilled personnel. 
Most importantly, there should be a careful analysis of the comparative 
effectiveness of the AVF and draft forces in 21st century military operations. 
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APPENDIX.  TURKISH DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY 
STRATEGY 
A. TURKEY’S NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY 
The threats and risks directed at Turkey's security in the post-Cold War period are 
rather different from those in the past. 
At the end of the Cold War and the struggle between blocks, there was a search 
for a new world order directed at globalization, which also changed the concepts of 
threat. While the concept of threat was previously evident and large at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, it has become multi-directional, multi-dimensional and variable 
and instabilities dominate the environment. The traditional concept of threat has now 
started to contain new threats and risks emerging in the form of: 
• Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
• Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, 
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, 
• Religious fundamentalism, 
• Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and 
• International terrorism. 
Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, Caucasus 
and the Middle East, where the new threats and risks are concentrated. Turkey is in a 
region where the interests of the global powers and formations intersect. This situation, 
stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location, has not changed until the present and will 
not change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that the importance and place of 





Turkey's Defense Policy is directed at defense due to her natural characteristics 
and is prepared to protect and preserve national independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and vital interests of the country. For that reason, the following are the targets of 
Turkey in her National Defense Policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a 
requirement of the period: 
• To contribute to peace and security in the region and to spread this to large 
areas, 
• To become a country producing strategy and security that could influence 
all the strategies aimed as her region and beyond, 
• To become an element of power and balance in her region and 
• To make use of every opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation, 
becoming closer and developing positive relations. 
The basic principles of the Defense policy determined in the framework of the 
principle, “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” set forth by Atatürk, are as follows: 
• To make a maximum contribution to reducing all kinds of international 
tensions and provision of just and lasting peace, 
• To preserve and protect independence, territorial integrity and the 
republic, 
• To take all measures to prevent crises and conflicts and 
• To take an active part in collective defense systems and to fulfill the 
responsibilities entrusted to it. 
B. TURKEY’S MILITARY STRATEGY 
Turkey's Military Strategy contains four important matters to be able to support 
the specified defense policy. 
1. Deterrence 
Maintaining a military force that will provide a deterrent influence on the centers 
of risk and threat in the environment of instability and uncertainty surrounding Turkey 
constitutes the foundation of the National Military Strategy. 
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2. Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in 
Crises 
In the crises concerning Turkey's security, for the peaceful solution of the 
disagreements in conformity with the diplomatic, economic and other crisis management 
measures, for the Turkish Armed Forces to be ready to contribute to reducing tension, 
preventing them from transforming into armed conflicts or restricting the aggressor, is 
one of the most important elements of its strategy. 
The contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces to the international efforts for the 
solution of crises threatening peace and stability within the United Nations and Alliances 
to which it is a party, in connection with political decisions along with the crises in its 
region and to be ready to preserve, establish and maintain world peace are also in the lead 
among the subjects that cannot be relinquished. 
3. Forward Defense 
To be able to determine as soon as possible the scope of a probable aggression 
and when subjected to an actual external aggression, the principle of stopping this 
aggression constitutes the foundation of forward defense. 
4. Collective Security 
Active participation in international and regional alliances/organizations existing, 
with NATO and the WEU in the lead, and those being formed, such as the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), continues to be one of the basic elements of the 
Turkish National Military Strategy. 
To contribute with military forces to international organizations, alliances and 
related states in accordance with the national security and foreign policy of Turkey, 
continuation of providing cooperation, technical assistance and training related to 
military subjects constitute the basis of Turkey's collective security concept. 
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The formation of a force structure conforming to the defense policy and strategy, 
of which the main principles are summarized above, is of great importance. For Turkey to 
attain a military power having the resources and capabilities of supporting the National 
Security Policy of Turkey, which is subject to multifaceted threats due to her geopolitical 
and geostrategic position, maintaining and developing this force according to the 
requirements of the conditions and the period, constitute the basis for Turkey's  Defense 
Policy and Strategy in the twenty-first century.88 
 
                                                 
88 Turkish Defense Policy and Military Strategy, Turkish Ministry of Defense, 
http://www.msb.mil.tr/Birimler/GNPP/html/pdf/p4c1.pdf (accessed February 12, 2007). 
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